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In this report, we simulate practical feature of Yuen-Kim protocol for quantum key distribu-
tion with unconditional secure. In order to demonstrate them experimentally by intensity mod-
ulation/direct detection(IMDD) optical fiber communication system, we use simplified encoding
scheme to guarantee security for key information(1 or 0). That is, pairwise M-ary intensity modu-
lation scheme is employed. Furthermore, we give an experimental implementation of YK protocol
based on IMDD.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that quantum key distribution is one of
the most interesting subjects in quantum information sci-
ence, which was pioneered by C.Bennett and G.Brassard
in 1984[1]. In the original paper of Bennett, single pho-
ton communication was employed as implementation of
quantum key distribution. However, despite that it is
not essential in great idea of Bennett, many researchers
employed single photon communication scheme to realize
BB84, B92[2]. Because of the difficulties of single pho-
ton communication in practical sense, it was discussed
whether one can realize a secure key distribution guar-
anteed by quantum nature based on light wave commu-
nication or not.
In 1998, H.P.Yuen and A.Kim[3] proposed another
scheme for key distribution based on communication the-
ory(signal detection theory). This scheme corresponds
to an implementation of secret key sharing which was
information theoretically predicted by Maurer[4], et al.
However, Yuen’s idea was found independently from
Maurer’s discussion. In the first paper of Yuen-Kim[3],
they showed that if noises of Eve(eavesdropper) and
Bob(receiver) are statistically independent, secure key
distribution can be realized even if they are classical
noises, in which they employed a modification of B92
protocol[2]. Following YK’s first paper, a simple experi-
mental demonstration of YK protocol based on classical
noise was reported[5], and recently YK scheme with 1
Gbps and 10 km long fiber system based on quantum
shot noise was demonstrated[6]. However, these schemes
are not unconditional secure. That is, ability of signal
detection of Eve can be superior to that of Bob. As a re-
sult, an interesting question arises ” Is it possible to cre-
ate a system with current technology that could provide
a communication in which always Bob’s error probability
is superior to that of Eve?”
In proceedings paper of QCM and C 2002, Yuen and
his coworker reported that YK protocol can be uncondi-
tional secure, even if one uses conventional optical com-
munication system[7]. This is interesting result for engi-
neer, and will open a new trend of quantum cryptogra-
phy.
In this report, we simulate practical feature of Yuen-
Kim protocol for quantum key distribution with uncon-
ditional secure, and propose a scheme to implement them
using our former experimental setup[6].
II. YUEN-KIM PROTOCOL
A. Basis
A fundamental concept of Yuen-Kim protocol follows
the next remark.
Remark: If there are statistically independent noises be-
tween Eve and Bob, there exist a secure key distribution
based on communication.
They emphasized that the essential point of security of
the key distribution is detectability of signals. This is
quite different with the principle of BB-84, et al which are
followed by no cloning theorem. That is, BB-84 and oth-
ers employ a principle of disturbance of quantum states to
give a guarantee of security, but YK protocol employs a
principle of communication theory. It was clarified that
this scheme can be realized as a modification of B-92.
However, this scheme allows us use of classical noise, and
it cannot provide unconditional secure. Then, Yuen and
his coworker showed that YK scheme is to be uncondi-
tional secure in which a fundamental theorem in quantum
detection theory was used for his proof of security as fol-
lows.
Theorem: (Helstrom-Holevo-Yuen)
Signals with non commuting density operators cannot be
distinguished without error.
So if we assign non commuting density operators for bit
signals 1 and 0, then one cannot distinguish without er-
ror. When the error is 1/2 based on quantum noise, there
is no way to distinguish them. So we would like to make
such a situation on process between Alice and Eve. To
do so, a new version of YK scheme was given as follows:
(a) The sender(Alice) uses an explicit key(a short
2key:K, expanded into a long key:K∗ by use of a
stream cipher) to modulate the parameters of a mul-
timode coherent state.
(b) State |Ψ0〉 = |α/
√
2〉1 ⊗ |α/
√
2〉2 is prepared. Bit
encoding can be represented as follows:
|Ψb〉 = exp{−iJzφb}|Ψ0〉
= |e−iφb/2α/
√
2〉1 ⊗ |eiφb/2α/
√
2〉2 (1)
where Jz = (a
†
1a1 − a†2a2)/2.
(c) Alice uses the running key K∗ to specify a basis
from a set of M uniformly distributed two-mode co-
herent state.
(d) The message X is encoded as YK∗(X). This map-
ping of the stream of bits is the key to be shared by
Alice and Bob. Because of his knowledge K∗, Bob
can demodulate from YK∗(X) to X.
B. Security
Here, let us introduce the original discussion on the
security. The ciphering angle φν could have k in general
as discrete or continuous variable determined by distri-
bution of keys. A ciphered two mode state may be
|Ψbk〉 = exp{−iJz(φb + φk)}|Ψ0〉 (2)
The corresponding density operator for all possible
choices of k is ρb, where b = 1 or 0. The problem is to
find the minimum error probability that Eve can achieve
in bit determination. To find the optimum detection pro-
cess for discrimination between ρ1 and ρ0 is the problem
of quantum detection theory. The solution is given by[8]
< Pe >= min
Π
(p1Trρ1Π0 + p0Trρ0Π1) (3)
As an example of encoding to create < Pe >= Pe(E) =
1/2 which is the error probability of Eve, Yuen et al sug-
gested certain modulation scheme. In that case, closest
values of a given k can be associated with distinct bits
from the bit at position k, and two closest neighboring
states represent distinct bits which means a set of base
state. In this scheme, they assumed that one chooses a
set of basis state(keying state for 1 and 0) for bits without
overlap. The error probability for density operators ρ1
and ρ0 becomes 1/2, when number of a set of basis state
increases. Asymptotic property of the error probability
depends on the amplitude of coherent state[7][9].
III. SIMPLIFIED MODULATION SCHEME IN
YK PROTOCOL
A. Basic protocol
Original scheme of YK protocol in the above can be
realized by practical devices. To apply them to fiber
communication system, we would like to realize them
by intensity modulation/direct detection scheme. If one
does not want to get perfect YK scheme, one can more
simplify the implementation of YK protocol.
From a fundamental principle in quantum detection
theory, we can construct non-commuting density opera-
tors from sets based on non-orthogonal states when one
does not allow overlap of the selection of a set of basis
state for 1 and 0. On the other hand, when we allow
overlap for selection of a set of basis state, one can use
orthogonal state to construct the same density operators
for 1 and 0. That is, ρ1 = ρ0. However, in this case,
unknown factor for Eve is only an initial short key, and a
stream of bits that Eve observed is perfectly the same as
those of Alice and Bob, though Eve cannot estimate the
bits at that time. This gives still insecure situation. So,
here, we employ a combination of non-orthogonality and
overlap selection in order to reduce the number of basis
sets.
Let us assume that the maximum amplitude is fixed as
αmax. We divide it into 2M. So we have M sets of basis
state{(A1, A2), (B1, B2), . . .}. Total set of basis state is
given as shown in Fig.1. Each set of basis state is used
for {1, 0}, and {0, 1}, depending on initial keys.
Set A1 : 0 → |α(1)〉, 1→ |α(M/2+1)〉 (4)
Set A2 : 0 → |α(M/2+1)〉, 1→ |α(1)〉 (5)
So the density operators for 1 and 0 for Eve are
ρ1 = ρ0 =
1
2
(|α(1)〉〈α(1)|+ |α(M/2+1)〉〈α(M/2+1)|) (6)
For the sets of {B1, B2}, {C1, C2},. . ., let us assign 0 and
1 by the same way as Eqs(4),(5). In this case, Eve cannot
get key information, but she can try to know the infor-
mation of quantum states used for bit transmission. So
this is the problem for discrimination of 2M pure states.
The error probability is given by
< Pe >= min
Π
(1−
∑
piTrρiΠi) (7)
Although we have many results for calculation of opti-
mum detection problems[10][11][12], to solve this prob-
lem is still difficult at present time, because the set
of states does not have complete symmetric structure.
So we here give the lower bound and tight upper
bound. The lower bound is given by the minimum er-
ror probability:P ∗e (2) for signal set {|α(1)〉, |α(2)〉} which
are neighboring states. It is given as follows:
P ∗e (2) =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− exp[−|α1 − α2|2]
)
(8)
The upper bound is given by applying square root mea-
surement for 2M pure states. The numerical properties
are shown in Fig.2-(a). Thus if M increases, then her er-
ror for information on quantum states increases. In this
case, pure guessing corresponds to (2M − 1)/(2M). The
3error probability of Bob, however, is independent of the
number of set of basis state, and it is given as follows:
Pe(B) =
1
2
(1−
√
1− |〈α1|αM/2+1〉|2) (9)
We emphasize that Eve cannot get key information in this
stage, because the information for 1 and 0 are modulated
by the way of Eqs(4),(5). Furthermore, this scheme can
send 2M bits by M sets of basis state.
Let us apply the original scheme such that M bits are
sent by M sets of basis state. In this case, Eve will try to
get key information, so the density operators for Eve be-
come mixed states ρ1, ρ0 consisting of set of states which
send 1 and 0, respectively. The numerical properties are
shown in Fig.2-(b). Both schemes have almost same se-
curity, but the latter can only send M bits by M sets of
basis state. In other word, the number of sets is reduced
to 1/2 in the former scheme.
IV. PRIMARY DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTAL
SET
In implementing YK protocol by conventional fiber
communication system, we use here our proposed sys-
tem. Figure 3 shows the experimental setup. The laser
diode serves as 1.3µm light source. A pattern generator
provides a signal pulse string to send keys. A modulator
which selects basis state follows a driver of laser diode.
The selector gives selection of amplitude and assignment
of 1 and 0, and is controlled by initial keys. The laser
driver is driven by output signals of modulator. The op-
tical divider corresponds to Eve. The case 1 is a type
of “opaque”, and the case 2 is a type of “translucent”.
The channel consists of 10 Km fiber and ATT. We can
change the distance equivalently from 10 Km to 200Km
by ATT.
The speed of pulse generator to drive laser diode is
311Mbps, 622Mbps, and 1.2Gbps. The detector of Bob
is InGaAs pin photo loaded by 50Ω register, and it is con-
nected to an error probability counter which can apply
to 12 Gbps. The dark current is 7nA and the minimum
received power of our system is about -30 dBm.
In this system, the problem for degree of security is
only power advantage of Eve which will be set in near
transmitter(Alice). When the eavesdropping is opaque,
the error probability of Bob increases drastically, and the
error probability counter shows almost 1/2, which means
that the error of Eve is also 1/2. In this case, prob-
lem of communication distance is not so important. We
can detect the existence of Eve in any distance of chan-
nel. When the eavesdropping is translucent, Eve has to
take only few power(η << 1) from the main stream of
bits sequence in order to avoid the power level distur-
bance. In this case, the error of Bob does not increase.
As a result, Alice and Bob cannot detect the existence
of Eve. The secure communication distance depends on
the error probabilities of Bob and Eve. Let κ be trans-
parency of channel from Alice to Bob. The detectability
for Bob in this experiment setup depends on the signal
distance(amplitude difference between two states as ba-
sis state): κ(αmax/2) for {|κα(1)〉, |κα(M/2+1)〉}, and that
of Eve depends on the signal distance: η × αmax/(2M).
Here we assume that κ = η, and the total loss is 20dB
which corresponds to 100 Km. Since our receiver requires
about -30 dBm, the transmitter is -10 dBm. When M in-
creases, sufficiently the error of Eve increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We examined a simulation of YK protocol based on in-
tensity modulation/direct detection fiber communication
system, and showed a design of implementation of secure
system based on our experimental setup which was used
to demonstrate the first version of implementation of YK
protocol. We will soon report complete demonstration in
experiment by the above system.
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FIG. 1: Selection of basis state
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(a) Error probability of Eve. Holizontal line: upper is number
of pure states 2M ; lower is number of set of basis state.
0 5 10 15 200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
amax = 100
amax = 20
amax = 50
amax = 10
M
E
r
r
o
r
 
p
r
o
ba
bi
li
ty
(b) Error probability of Eve. Holizontal line is number of set
of basis state.
FIG. 2: Error probability of Eve
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FIG. 3: Experimental setup
